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Abstract  
This paper explores whether asymmetric pricing can be identified in the eleven euro 
zone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) by utilizing Error Correction Model on the weekly 
price changes in order to assess current and future potential.  The sample spans from 
July 1996 to August 2011. We also try to analyze the effect of competition on the 
dynamic adjustment of gasoline price to which has been paid scant attention in the 
past. The results favor the common perception that retail gasoline prices respond 
asymmetrically to cost increases and decreases both in the long and the short-run. At 
the wholesale segment, there is a symmetric response of the spot prices of gasoline 
towards the adjustment to the short-run responses of the exchange rate.          
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I.  Introduction  
 
Market structure and market dynamics in oil industry across the globe are 
highly complicated and diversified in many aspects. To mention but a few, these are 
the existing differences in oil reserves, different levels of oil markets development, 
different political and regulatory environments, and different responses to growth 
challenges (Fafaliou and Polemis, 2011). Hence, to avoid generalization pitfalls and 
gain better policy insights, the existing oil literature often examines this industry’s 
issues by distinguishing two broad sub-markets’ categories. These are namely the 
upstream and the downstream oil market segment. The upstream segment comprises 
all the activities that have to be done to extract oil from earth whereas the downstream 
segment relates to activities necessary to get oil from producers to final consumers. In 
particular, the oil downstream includes the transportation of oil to refineries, the 
refinement of crude oil into final products, the transportation of these products to 
storage terminals, and the trading of the products produced by the wholesalers and 
retailers  
 In most European countries oil industry is still heavily regulated due to fears 
of problems that may arise particularly in case of an oil crisis. Upstream activities (oil 
extraction) are assumed more concentrated compared to downstream segments 
(refining, transportation, wholesale and retail trading) wherein the level of 
competition and deregulation policies play a crucial role. Globalized oil markets are 
not homogenous and the characteristics and competition differ even among the 
various sub-markets of the same oil industry.   
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The oil industry in the EU continues to be dominated by large, integrated and 
often multinational companies that are active in all stages of oil production 
(extraction, processing/refinement and retail). They can be distinguished into 
multinational majors (ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP) and minimajors – 
multinational companies that limit their activities to few Member States 
(TexacoChevron or TotalFinaElf). Other competitors, predominantly active at the 
national level, include Eni (Italy), Statoil, Orlen or OMV (Austria). The average size 
of companies differs between the different stages of the production process. More 
specifically, extraction and refinement in particular are dominated by a small number 
of large firms, whereas a larger number of smaller firms are active in the retail of 
automotive fuels.   
It is worth mentioning that in the EU retail market segment, there is a 
consolidation in the number of sites, leading to rising average throughput and 
reductions in the number of sites per capita (Pöyry, 2009). Furthermore, there is an 
increasing emergence of supermarkets / hypermarkets selling road fuel at their sites in 
some markets (most notably in the UK and France), while many petrol stations 
provide supplementary services (i.e car washing, dishes, toys, plates and glasses, 
music CD’s, loyalty cards, etc).   
Gasoline prices among the EU-11 (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) were characterized 
by high volatility within the last years (Figure 1). The net retail gasoline prices in the 
EU-11 have shown a tremendous increase during the last two years (31.2%) reaching 
(in real terms) the level of 0.584 Euro / litre on average (August 2011). On the other 
hand, the pump gasoline price (taxes and duties included) in the EU-11 reached the 
level of 1.513 Euro / litre on average within the same period (August 2011). Due to 
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this price volatility, consumers have become more reluctant to the oil companies’ 
price setting behaviour.  
Figure 1: Pump gasoline price evolution in Europe and the USA  
Average real net pump gasoline price in the EU-12 (Jan-Aug 2011)
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Source: Oil Bulletin and USA Energy Information Administration.   
A comparison of net pump prices for gasoline (euro-95) in the twelve member 
states (Figure 1) for the period January 2001-August 2011 shows a difference of 
around 8.4 cents/litre between the country with lowest price (Austria) and the country 
with the highest (Italy). More specifically, countries like Austria, Greece, Germany 
and France are well bellow the european average (0.583 euro / litre) while retail 
gasoline prices in other European countries (Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Netherlands) 
are significant higher. However, comparisons between prices and price trends in 
different countries shall be carefully made because of differences in product quality, 
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in marketing practices, in market structures, and to the extent that standard categories 
are representative of the total sales of a given product. 
On the other side of the globe (United States) spot prices and pump retail 
prices (with taxes and charges) are highly correlated and follow each other closely 
(Figure 1). More specifically, during the period running form January 2000 until June 
2011 pump retail price of unleaded gasoline was strongly fluctuated (430 times). 293 
adjustments were upward and 137 adjustments were downward covering the 68% and 
32% of the total price fluctuations respectively. Examining the distribution of the size 
of the adjustments we see that they were quite small in the period 2000-2007 whereas 
became more volatile from 2008 onwards. The price of crude oil has followed a 
similar pattern. More specifically, within the same period, the price of crude oil has 
fluctuated 474 times; 296 (62%) adjustments were upward and 178 (38%) 
adjustments were downward.     
Within the last years there is a plethora of studies on the existence of price 
asymmetry in the gasoline market with controversial results. The majority of these 
studies apply cointegration techniques and especially Engle-Granger methodology by 
utilizing an asymmetric error-correction model in order to discover the existence of 
price asymmetries. Table 1 reports the main empirical studies.  
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Table 1: Summary of main literature review 
Study Country / product Frequency / Period Stage of 
transmission 
Model Findings  
Polemis, 2011  
Greece / gasoline Monthly / 1988 mid 2006 Wholesale and retail market Error-correction model 
Retail gasoline prices respond 
asymmetrically to cost increases and 
decreases both. At the wholesale segment, 
there is a symmetric response of the spot 
prices of gasoline towards the adjustment to 
the short-run responses of the exchange rate. 
Bermingham and 
O’ Brien. 2010  
United Kingdom and Ireland / 
gasoline and diesel Monthly / 1997-mid 2009 Retail market Threshold autoregressive model No 
Clerides, S, 2010  Several European countries Weekly 2000-2010 Retail market Error-correction model Mixed results 
European 
Commission, 2009 Several European countries / gasoline, heating oil, diesel  Weekly time period varies  Retail market Error-correction model 
Mixed evidence for asymmetry in the 
markets for heating oil, diesel oil and 
gasoline.  
Faber, 2009  
Netherlands / gasoline Daily 2006-2008 Wholesale / Retail market Error-correction model 
38% of stations respond asymmetrically. No 
evidence of asymmetry at the level of the oil 
companies. 
Valadkhani, 2009  Australia / gasoline Monthly / 1998-2009 Retail market Error-correction model Evidence of asymmetry in four out of seven Australian capital cities. 
Kuper and 
Poghosyan, 2008  
USA / gasoline  Weekly / 1986-2005 Retail market Error-correction model 
Pre 1999: International oil price adjusts 
linearly to deviations from the 
long-term equilibrium. 
Post 1999: Retail prices increased at a faster 
pace after an 
oil shock than during the pre-1999 period. 
Kaufmann  
and Laskowski, 
2005 
United States / gasoline and 
home heating oil Monthly / 1986-2002 Wholesale and retail market Error-correction model 
Mixed results 
Bachmeir and 
Griffin, 2003 United States  / gasoline Daily / 1985-1998 Wholesale market Error-correction model 
Mixed results 
Bettendorf, et al, 
2003 Netherlands / gasoline Weekly / 1996-2001 Retail market Error-correction model 
Mixed results 
Galeotti, et al, 
2003 
Germany, France, UK, Italy 
and Spain / gasoline Monthly / 1985-2000 Wholesale and retail market Error-correction model 
Mixed results 
Johnson, 2002 United States / gasoline and 
diesel Weekly / 1996-1998 Retail market Error-correction model 
Mixed results 
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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More specifically, Kirchgässner and Kübler, (1992), used an error correction 
model to investigate possible price asymmetries in the wholesale and retail gasoline 
and heating oil markets in Germany for the period 1972-89. Their results differ 
according to the relevant time period. More specifically, for the 1980s the authors find 
rapid symmetric and full adjustment of the retail prices to the spot prices (Rotterdam 
prices), whereas there is considerable short-run asymmetry in the 1970s.   
Clerides (2010) uses data from several European Union (EU) countries to 
investigate the response retail gasoline prices to changes in the world oil price. The 
findings indicate significant variation in the adjustment mechanism across countries. 
Fluctuations in the international price of oil are transported to local prices with some 
delay but evidence of asymmetric adjustment is fairly weak. Statistically significant 
evidence of asymmetric responses is only found in a small number of countries, while 
in some countries there is even (weak) evidence of asymmetry in the reverse 
direction: prices drop faster than they rise.  
Bermingham and O’ Brien (2010) empirically test whether Irish and United 
Kingdom (UK) petrol and diesel markets are characterised by asymmetric pricing 
behaviour. The econometric assessment uses threshold autoregressive models and a 
dataset of monthly refined oil and retail prices covering the period 1997 to mid-
2009.Their study concluded that for both the Irish and UK liquid fuel markets at 
national levels, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that retail prices rise 
faster than they fall in response to changes in oil prices (price asymmetry).   
A different approach is followed in the pioneering study of Bacon (1991) who 
uses a quadratic quantity adjustment function to estimate the existence of price 
asymmetries in wholesale and retail gasoline market in the United Kingdom 
respectively. In this study, bi-weekly data are used for the period 1982-1989. 
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According to the main findings, the upward adjustment process is slightly faster than 
price reductions and the period of adjustment more concentrated than was the case 
when costs fell. Moreover, changes in the exchange rate necessitate two extra weeks 
relative to product prices before being incorporated in the retail gasoline prices 
Most of the studies under scrutiny primarily focus on prices asymmetries and 
few of them allow for other asymmetries. The paper by Galeotti et al (2003) re-
examines the issue of asymmetries in the retail market of gasoline by allowing 
possibly asymmetric role of the exchange rate. In their stimulating paper the issue of 
asymmetric pricing on specific European countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy, 
Spain) is examined by using an error-correction model and bootstrapping techniques 
in order to overcome the low-power problem of conventional testing procedures. 
Polemis (2011) by using the error-correction methodology in the Greek gasoline 
market reported that retail gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost increases 
and decreases both in the long and the short-run. However, at the wholesale segment, 
there is a symmetric response of the spot prices of gasoline towards the adjustment to 
the short-run responses of the exchange rate.  
Furthermore, Polemis & Fotis (2011) elaborate the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation to a panel data error correction model (ECM) in order to measure 
the asymmetries in the transmission of shocks to input prices and exchange rate onto 
the wholesale and retail gasoline price respectively. For this purpose, the authors use 
an updated data set of weekly observations covering the period from January 2000 to 
February 2011 for eleven euro zone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). The results favor 
the common perception that retail and wholesale gasoline prices respond 
asymmetrically to cost increases and decreases. 
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In contrast to several previous findings, the empirical results generally point to 
widespread differences in both adjustment speeds and short-run responses on prices 
and exchange rate when input prices are volatile. In order to assess the issue of 
asymmetric gasoline pricing, a small number of studies use daily data (Asplund, et al, 
2000; Bachmeir and Griffin, 2003; Johnson, 2002) for a number of countries 
(Sweden, United Kingdom and United States). 
 This paper has two objectives. Firstly, we explore whether asymmetric pricing 
can be identified in the eleven euro zone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Greece, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) by utilizing 
ECM on the weekly price changes in order to assess current and future potential. 
Despite the crucial importance of the relevant topic due to the recent oil price hikes, 
no one –to the best of our knowledge- has performed formal econometric tests that 
would allow the testing of the various explanations for price asymmetry against the 
available data. For that purpose, we employ sophisticated econometric techniques 
such as GMM and cointegrated panel data analysis.  
 Secondly, an in-depth analysis of the oil industry aiming at qualitative aspects 
of competition in euro zone area is expected to help government officials formulate 
better policies (that is policies which promote in a more effective way the functioning 
of the wholesale and retail oil segments). This paper differs from other relevant work 
in the field in a sense that it is the first approach focused at a comparative examination 
of the two downstream sub-markets of eleven euro zone countries.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a 
detailed description of the empirical model and the methodology employed. Section 
III reports our results and Section IV concludes the article.   
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II.  Methodology  
 
Following the specification of Bettendorf, et al, (2003), Polemis, (2011), 
Kaufmann and Laskowski, (2005), and Reilly and Witt, (1998), various unrestricted 
error-correction models are used to link the relevant variables. In order to investigate 
the adjustment path in the different relevant gasoline markets, we estimate two 
distinct asymmetric error-correction models that account for the wholesale and retail 
segment respectively. By taking into account the previous considerations, the basic 
(long-run) relationships are the following:  
SPGr,t =β0 +β1CRr,t +β2EXRc,t + εt                           (1)1 
 
NRPGc,t = β0 + β1SPGr,t + εt                                       (2) 
 
The above equations represent the long-run relationships in the wholesale 
(eq.1) and retail market respectively (eq.2). In order to investigate the effect of 
taxation (VAT and excise tax) in the possible asymmetrical movements of price in the 
retail segment, we estimated two ECMs per market segment by using two different 
dependent variables (See Appendix, Table A2)2. The aforementioned equations as 
well as the ECMs are estimated by using Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS). 
The main reason for using this method, is that although the OLS estimate of the 
cointegrating vector is superconsistent, it will contain a small-sample bias and the 
limiting distribution is non normal with a nonzero mean (Stock 1987). A bias in the 
estimate for the cointegrating vector will affect the cointegrating residual, which is an 
independent variable in the error correction model. This method gives an 
asymptotically efficient estimator which eliminates the feedback in the cointegrating 
                                                 
1
 The subscripts r and c denote the geographic region {i = Europe, USA} and the sample country 
respectively {n = Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom}.    
2
 For the explanation of the variables see Table A1 of the Appendix.  
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system (Stock and Watson, 2003; 1993). It involves augmenting the cointegrating 
regression with lags and leads so that the resulting cointegrating equation error term is 
orthogonal. Moreover, DOLS increases the efficiency and reduces the small sample 
bias relative to the OLS estimator, while DOLS generates asymptotically efficient 
estimates of the regression coefficients for variables that cointegrate (Kaufmann and 
Laskowski 2005). 
The interpretation of the relevant variables comes as follows: NRPG measured 
in Euro/litre for EU-11, pounds/litre for the UK and USD/gallon for the USA, denotes 
the net price of gasoline (excluding taxes and duties), SPG is the Rotterdam gasoline 
spot price measured in USD/gallon3. CR is the Brent spot price for Europe measured 
in USD/barrel4 and EXRt is the exchange rate between U.S dollar and national 
currencies (euro for EU-11 and pound for the UK respectively), while finally εt stands 
for the error term. The reason for using EXR in the wholesale model is related with 
the fact that exchange rate may be a relevant source of asymmetry in non-US 
countries. More specifically, as stated by Galeotti et al, (2003), since crude oil is paid 
for in dollars whereas gasoline sells for different sums of national currencies, the 
exchange rate plays a significant, possibly asymmetric role.    
The asymmetry in the transmission of changes in input prices to output prices 
can be accommodated within a dynamic model. In order to allow for possible price 
and exchange rate asymmetries we construct the following ECM specifications in the 
wholesale (eq. 3) and retail market (eq. 4):   
                                                 
3
 Due to lack of data we use from 4.4.2008 onwards, the New York spot prices of gasoline as a good 
proxy for the European spot gasoline prices (Rotterdam).        
4
 However, for the USA, we used the weekly WTI spot price as traded on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) for delivery at Cushing, Oklahoma.   
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0
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p
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λ
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The Greek letter ∆ is the first difference operator. In the above asymmetric 
ECMs, changes in the input prices (crude oil and spot prices) and fluctuations in the 
exchange rate are split into positive and negative changes, respectively. In other 
words as suggested by Galeotti, et al (2003) short-run asymmetry is captured by 
similarly decomposing price and exchange rate changes into ∆ 01 >−= −
+
ttt xxx  and 
∆ 01 <−= −
−
ttt xxx for x = CR,SPG,EXR. Hence ∆CRP = ∆CR if ∆CR>0 and 0 
otherwise. ∆SPGP = ∆SPG if ∆SPG>0 and 0 otherwise and ∆EXRP = ∆EXR if 
∆EXR>0 and 0 otherwise. The opposite holds for ∆CRN, ∆SPGN and ∆EXRN. 
Finally ECMP and ECMN denote the one-period lagged deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium (eqs 1 and 2) and account for asymmetry in the adjustment process. 
Similarly ECMP = εt>0 and 0 otherwise and ECMN = εt<0 and 0 otherwise. The 
orders k, l, m, n represent the number of lagged terms for decreases and increases in 
the explanatory variables respectively and are chosen by using the Akaike information 
criterion so as to make εt white noise.  
The sample spans the period from July 1996 to August 2011 using an updated 
weekly dataset of 792 observations to carry out a thorough investigation of gasoline 
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market in certain European countries and the USA5. All variables are in their natural 
logarithms. Energy prices for crude oil and spot price of gasoline are taken from the 
USA Energy Information Administration and are deflated by the Harmonised 
Consumer Price Index (HCPI) provided by the Eurostat. However, retail pre-tax 
gasoline prices measured in real terms (deflated by the HCPI) are obtained directly 
from the European Oil Bulletin6. Finally, data on the exchange rate between the 
national currencies and the US dollar are obtained from the European Central Bank 
and the Federal USA Bank7.  
 
III.  Empirical results  
 
Stationarity and cointegration of the variables  
 
Unit root inference is an important step in the analysis of data. If time series are 
integrated of order one (I-1), cointegration is necessary to establish that we are 
estimating structural and not spurious equations (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2003). 
For the investigation of the order of integration we have applied a series of diagnostic 
tests both in levels and first differences of the variables (Augmented Dickey –Fuller, 
Phillips-Perron and Elliot-Rothenberg and Stock Point Optimal tests). The results of 
the above tests are presented in Table 28. Applying the relevant tests, we observe that 
the null-hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at 5% critical value for all the 
relevant variables. In other words all the series are non-stationary in levels and 
stationary in first differences (I-1).  
                                                 
5
 Due to lack of data, the sample for the USA spans the period from December 1997 to June 2011 (n = 
709).   
6 The bulletin reports weekly the average Monday’s pump price with and without taxes and duties in 
each member state of the European Union.  
7
 Taking into account the fixed exchange rate for the EZ-11 countries and that of Euro/dollar provided 
by the European Central Bank we calculate the exchange rate national currency/dollar on each week for 
the period January 2002 onwards by using the following formulation: national currency / dollar = fixed 
exchange rate * euro/dollar 
8
 The unit root results as well as the cointegration tests regarding the alternative specifications of the 
retail stage model are available from the authors’ upon request.  
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Table 2: Results from unit root testing    
 Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (Philips-Perron) P-P Elliot-Rothenberg and Stock Point Optimal (ERS) 
Country  EXR NRPG SPG CR EXR NRPG SPG CR EXR NRPG SPG CR 
Austria  0.221 [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.145  [2] 
 (0.000)* [1] 
0.542  [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.225 [6]  
(0.000)* [1] 
0.156 [11]  
(0.000)* [8] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
36.322* [1] 
0.328 [0] 
4.075* [2]  
(0.316)  [1] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502)  [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Belgium  0.191  [3] (0.000)* [2] 
0.166  [0] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.229 [2]  
(0.000)* [8] 
0.227 [5]  
(0.000)* [8] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
32.155* [3] 
0.376 [2] 
3.068* [0]  
(0.231) [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Finland  0.229  [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.215  [0] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.262 [6] 
(0.000)* [1] 
0.257 [9]  
(0.000)* [8] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
36.206* [1] 
0.314 [0] 
3.418* [0]  
(0.232) [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
France  0.250  [1] 
 (0.000)* [0]  
0.443  [1] 
 (0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.240 [6] 
(0.000)* [1] 
0.485 [11]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
34.739* [1] 
0.357 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Germany  0.221  [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.227  [0] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.223 [6] 
(0.000)* [1] 
0.217 [5]  
(0.000)* [4] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
36.763* [1] 
0.326 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Greece  0.273  [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.232  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.269 [5] 
(0.000)* [1] 
0.251 [9]  
(0.000)* [3] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
44.899* [1] 
0.329 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Ireland  0.955  [0] (0.000)* [0] 
0.510  [0] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.955 [0] 
(0.000)* [3] 
0.255 [13]  
(0.000)* [13] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
14.345* [0] 
0.237 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502)  [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Italy  0.305  [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.380  [2] 
(0.000)* [1] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.331 [6] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.437 [14]  
(0.000)* [12] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
30.630* [1] 
0.312 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Netherlands  0.216  [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.240  [2] 
 (0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.218 [6] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.273 [5]  
(0.000)* [2] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
37.010* [1] 
0.330 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Portugal  0.257  [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.398  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.264 [6] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.244 [14]  
(0.000)* [14] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
35.743* [1] 
0.323 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
Spain  0.234  [1] (0.000)* [0] 
0.353  [2] 
(0.000)* [1] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.247 [6] 
(0.000)* [1] 
0.352 [14]  
(0.000)* [10] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
35.948* [1] 
0.316 [0] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
United Kingdom 0.672  [3] (0.000)* [2] 
0.689  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.542 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
0.746  [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.733 [5] 
(0.000)* [5] 
0.619 [15]  
(0.000)* [12] 
0.627 [8]  
(0.000)* [5] 
0.797 [1]  
(0.000)* [6] 
12.243* [3] 
0.399 [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
7.195*[1]  
(0.297) [0] 
United States  - 0.347  [2] (0.000)* [1] 
0.488 [1] 
(0.000)* [0] 
0.151 [3] 
(0.000)* [2] 
- 0.527 [14]  
(0.000)* [7] 
0.544 [2]  
(0.000)* [3] 
0.687 [0]  
(0.000)* [4] 
- 4.023* [3]  
(0.502) [2] 
4.530* [1]  
(0.335) [0] 
5.727*[3]  
(0.402) [2] 
Notes: The calculated statistics are those reported in Dickey and Fuller, (1981). The critical values at 5% and 1% for N = 50 are given in Dickey and Fuller (1981). The critical values for the 
Phillips Perron unit root tests are obtained from Dickey and Fuller, (1981). In the Elliot-Rothenberg and Stock Point Optimal (ERS) test the null hypothesis means that the variable is stationary 
whilst the alternative hypothesis denotes the existence of a unit root in the data generation process. Critical values fir the ERS test are computed by interpolating the simulation results provided 
by ERS (1996, Table 1, p.825) for T = {50, 100, 200, ∞ }. The number in square brackets denotes the lag length using the Schwarz Info Criterion, while the number in parenthesis refers to the 
first differences.* Indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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The next step is to examine if there is a cointegrated relationship between the non-
stationary variables of the models. The reason for using cointegration techniques is 
that nonstationary time series result to spurious regressions and hence do not allow 
statistical interpretation of the estimations. In order to overcome this problem, we 
apply the Johansen (1992) technique. This method allows us to examine whether there 
is a long-run co-movement of the variables.  
 
Table 3: Cointegration tests    
Country  Trace statistic Maximum eigenvalues 
 
Wholesale segment: SPG = f(CR, EXR)  
Austria  53.8* [r=0]  8.2 [r>=1] 45.6** [r=0]  7.8 [r>=1] 
Belgium  53.6* [r=0]  8.2 [r>=1] 45.3* [r=0]  7.8 [r>=1] 
Finland  53.7* [r=0]  8.0 [r>=1] 45.7* [r=0]  7.6 [r>=1] 
France  53.4* [r=0]  7.8 [r>=1] 45.6* [r=0]  7.4 [r>=1] 
Germany  53.7* [r=0]  8.2 [r>=1] 45.5* [r=0]  7.7 [r>=1] 
Greece  53.4* [r=0]  7.9 [r>=1] 45.5* [r=0]  7.5 [r>=1] 
Ireland  48.3* [r=0]  3.4 [r>=1] 44.8* [r=0]  2.8 [r>=1] 
Italy  53.2* [r=0]  7.4 [r>=1] 45.8* [r=0]  6.9 [r>=1] 
Netherlands  53.7* [r=0]  8.2 [r>=1] 45.5* [r=0]  7.8 [r>=1] 
Portugal  53.6* [r=0]  7.9 [r>=1] 45.7* [r=0]  7.5 [r>=1] 
Spain  53.7* [r=0]  8.2 [r>=1] 45.6* [r=0]  7.9 [r>=1] 
United Kingdom 51.8* [r=0]  6.2 [r>=1] 45.6* [r=0]  4.7 [r>=1] 
United States+  48.9* [r=0]  7.5 [r>=1] 41.4* [r=0]  4.4 [r>=1] 
Retail segment: NRPG = f( SPG) 
Austria  30.8** [r=0]  5.6 [r>=1] 21.2** [r=0]  5.6 [r>=1] 
Belgium  15.7** [r=0]  1.5 [r>=1] 14.2 [r=0]  1.5 [r>=1] 
Finland  20.9* [r=0]  2.2 [r>=1] 18.7* [r=0]  2.2 [r>=1] 
France  20.5** [r=0]  3.2 [r>=1] 13.9 [r=0]  3.2 [r>=1] 
Germany  23.4* [r=0]  1.2 [r>=1] 22.2* [r=0]  1.2 [r>=1] 
Greece  21.8* [r=0]  2.8 [r>=1] 15.3 [r=0]  2.8 [r>=1] 
Ireland  34.5* [r=0]  2.8*** [r>=1] 31.7* [r=0]  2.8*** [r>=1] 
Italy  23.0* [r=0]  3.2 [r>=1] 13.8 [r=0]  3.2 [r>=1] 
Netherlands  23.2* [r=0]  2.9 [r>=1] 13.9* [r=0]  2.9 [r>=1] 
Portugal  28.0** [r=0]  8.7 [r>=1] 19.3*** [r=0]  8.7 [r>=1] 
Spain  24.8*** [r=0]  10.7 [r>=1] 14.1 [r=0]  10.7*** [r>=1] 
United Kingdom 18.4** [r=0]  1.7 [r>=1] 16.7** [r=0]  1.7 [r>=1] 
United States  31.9* [r=0]  2.9 [r>=1] 28.9* [r=0]  2.9 [r>=1] 
Notes: (+) The variable EXR is not included in the cointegration testing. Null hypothesis implies 
absence of cointegration, while r denotes the number of cointegrating equations with no deterministic 
trend. Significant at *1%, **5% and ***10% respectively.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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Table 3 presents the maximum-likelihood eigenvalue statistics9. It is evident that the 
null hypothesis (no cointegration) is rejected at 1% level for all the sample 
countries10. The estimated likelihood ratio tests and eigenvalues indicate that there is 
one cointegration vector for each model (gasoline and diesel). 
 
Long - run estimations  
In this subsection, we take up estimation of the long run coefficients given that we 
have established cointegration. That is, given that eqs. 1-2 represent structural and not 
spurious long-run relations; we proceed to estimate the parameters.  
 In the wholesale specification, the estimated coefficients on crude oil (CR) 
are significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level for all the countries 
involved. The magnitude of the relevant coefficient does not reveal a significant 
variation between the scrutinized countries indicating that the crude oil is an 
important cost marker. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients is significantly 
high exceeding 0.92. In other words in the long run, a change in the crude oil price is 
fully passed to the wholesale price of gasoline. On the other hand, fluctuations in the 
exchange rate do not play significant role in the wholesale price formation since the 
relevant coefficients for all of the sample countries are not statistical significant.  
                                                 
9
 The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration relationship, so r = 0. 
10
 However, in the retail segment according to maximum eigenvalues, the existence of a cointegration 
relationship does not hold for a number of countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain). Since 
the two statistics (i.e trace statistics and maximum eigenvalues) yield different results, one cannot reach 
a definite conclusion. However, we can accept the hypothesis of cointegration for the aforementioned 
countries as a working hypothesis.       
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Table 4: Long-run estimates  
Variables    Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK USA 
Wholesale segment: SPG = f(CR, EXR) 
c -3.343* -3.356* -3.343* -3.333* -3.329* -3.343* -3.322* -3.354* -3.331* -3.378* -3.365* -3.341* -3.384* 
CR  0.926* 0.927* 0.927* 0.926* 0.926* 0.928* 0.925* 0.926* 0.927* 0.927* 0.927* 0.918* 0.946* 
EXR  0.006 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.007 -0.087 - 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2  0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.975 
Durbin-Watson  0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.178 0.175 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.277 
S.E of regression  0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.077 
Retail segment: NRPG = f(SPG) 
c -0.982* -1.028* -1.039* -1.142* -1.103* -0.980* -0.952* -0.937* -0.915* -0.935* -1.000* -1.424* 0.427* 
SPG  0.344* 0.469* 0.496* 0.582* 0.515* 0.431* 0.328* 0.431* 0.422* 0.391* 0.431* 0.873* 0.707 * 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2  0.811 0.904 0.854 0.911 0.928 0.849 0.702 0.918 0.884 0.602 0.911 0.950 0.985 
Durbin-Watson  0.059 0.253 0.164 0.051 0.254 0.038 0.109 0.040 0.078 0.037 0.044 0.080 0.152 
S.E of regression 0.089 0.082 0.110 0.097 0.076 0.097 0.115 0.069 0.082 0.171 0.072 0.106 0.042 
C denotes the constant term. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.    
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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In the retail segment11 it is evident that the spot price estimated coefficients 
(SPG) are statistically significant and have the anticipated signs. More specifically, 
the price effect on the net retail price of gasoline is positive and substantial in 
magnitude, with the relevant coefficients bellow unity. It is worth mentioning that the 
relevant magnitude of the spot price coefficients shows significant variation between 
the sample countries. More specifically, in countries such as Austria, Ireland, Portugal 
and Netherlands, Greece, Italy and Spain the estimated coefficient is bellow 0.5, 
indicating that a change in the gasoline spot price is not fully passed through to the net 
retail price. The relatively smaller pass-through price mechanism (compared to the 
wholesale segment) is due to the fact that as we are moving down the oil supply 
chain, the upstream oil price becomes a smaller portion of the cost of the price of oil 
in the next stage (Polemis, 2011). Therefore a change in the upstream oil price would 
generate a smaller price increase downstream. On the other hand, in countries like the 
United Kingdom and the United States, the long-run response of net gasoline price to 
spot price variations is bigger in its magnitude estimated to 0.873 and 0.707 
respectively.  
  
Results from the error correction models (short – run estimations) 
Table 5 depicts the results from the estimation of the two ECM’s (wholesale 
and retail level). Each coefficient of the explanatory variables denotes the short-run 
response to the output prices (spot and retail prices). In order to select the appropriate 
number of lags in the ECM’s, we try to minimise the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC).  
     
                                                 
11
 Due to space limitation, the long-run estimates from the two alternative specifications per market 
segment are available from the authors’ upon request.  
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Table 5: Estimation results of the ECMs  
Variables    Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK USA 
c 
-0.001 
( -0.000) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.002***) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.001) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.001) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.002) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.000) 
 
-0.000 
(0.002**) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.000) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.000) 
 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
 
∆SPGt-1 
1.202* 
 
1.173* 
 
1.120* 
 
1.187* 
 
1.123* 
 
0.891* 
 
1.245* 
 
1.176* 
 
1.181* 
 
1.161* 
 
1.201* 
 
1.244* 
 
- 
 
∆SPGt-2 -0.052
**
 
 
-0.050** 
 
-0.052** 
 
-0.051** 
 
-0.048** 
 
0.680* 
 
-0.053** 
 
-0.051** 
 
-0.052** 
 
-0.050** 
 
-0.052** 
 
-0.052** 
 
- 
 
∆NRPGt-1 (0.500
*) 
 
(0.411*) 
 
- 
 
(0.448*) 
 
(0.384*) 
 
(0.553*) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.512*) 
 
(0.100*) 
 
(0.298*) 
 
(0.529*) 
 
(0.467*) 
 
(0.437*) 
 
ECMPt-1 
-1.087* 
(-0.693*) 
 
-1.059* 
(-0.601*) 
 
-1.059* 
(-0.121*) 
 
-1.074* 
(-0.406*) 
 
-1.012* 
(-0.660*) 
 
-0.791* 
(-0.648*) 
 
-1.137* 
(-0.106***) 
 
-1.062* 
(-0.356*) 
 
-1.067* 
(-0.571*) 
 
-1.048* 
(-0.165*) 
 
-1.088* 
(-0.547*) 
 
-1.136* 
(-0.213*) 
 
-0.244* 
(-0.119**) 
 
ECMNt-1 
-0.974* 
(-0.519*) 
 
-0.946* 
(-0.781*) 
 
-0.946* 
(-0.185*) 
 
-0.961* 
(-0.208*) 
 
-0.896* 
(-0.668*) 
 
-0.670* 
(-0.602*) 
 
-1.018* 
(-0.041) 
 
-0.949* 
(-0.377*) 
 
-0.955* 
(-0.256*) 
 
-0.934* 
(-0.187*) 
 
-0.975* 
(-0.357*) 
 
-1.017* 
(-0.223*) 
 
-0.213* 
(-0.064***) 
 
∆CRPt 0.651
*
 
 
0.654* 
 
0.650* 
 
0.652* 
 
0.657* 
 
0.680* 
 
0.662* 
 
0.653* 
 
0.650* 
 
0.652* 
 
0.651* 
 
0.668* 
 
0.745* 
 
∆CRPt-1 
-0.729* 
- 
-0.711* 
- 
-0.729* 
[-0.055] 
-0.719* 
- 
-0.672* 
- 
-0.508* 
- 
-0.761* 
- 
-0.710* 
- 
-0.712* 
- 
-0.699* 
- 
-0.728* 
- 
-0.760* 
- 
0.158* 
 
∆CRNt 0.690
*
 
 
0.695* 
 
0.689* 
 
0.691* 
 
0.695* 
 
0.704* 
 
0.699* 
 
0.691* 
 
0.690* 
 
0.691* 
 
0.689* 
 
0.707* 
 
0.801* 
 
∆CRNt-1 -0.930* -0.907* -0.933* -0.920* -0.873* -0.705* -0.967* -0.912* -0.916* -0.900* -0.931* -0.969* - 
∆SPGPt (0.424)* (0.452*) (0.444*) (0.410*) (0.505*) (0.315*) (-0.011) (0.226*) (0.463*) (0.059) (0.296*) (0.157*) (0.370*) 
∆SPGNt (0.334)* (0.471*) (0.436*) (0.233*) (0.366*) (0.363*) (-0.025) (0.218*) (0.481*) (0.099**) (0.207*) (0.066*) (0.216*) 
∆SPGPt-1 - - (-0.103*) - - - - - - - - - (-0.083*) 
∆SPGNt-1 - - - - - - - - - - - - (0.083*) 
∆EXRPt 
-0.129 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.167 
 
-0.129 
 
-0.152 
 
-0.139 
 
0.030 
 
-0.150 
 
-0.191 
 
-0.159 
 
-0.155 
 
0.063 
 
- 
 
∆EXRNt 
-0.105 
 
-0.106 
 
-0.099 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.118 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.088 
 
-0.021 
 
- 
Diagnostics  
Adjusted R2  
0.545 
(0.423) 
 
0.550 
(0.277) 
 
0.550 
(0.190) 
 
0.550 
(0.633) 
 
0.550 
(0.303) 
 
0.541 
(0.489) 
 
0.543 
(0.005) 
 
0.544 
(0.524) 
 
0.545 
(0.525) 
 
0.544 
(0.588) 
 
0.545 
(0.506) 
 
0.544 
(0.256) 
 
0.466 
(0.700) 
 
Durbin-Watson  
1.995 
(2.022) 
 
1.997 
(2.175) 
 
1.996 
(2.031) 
 
1.995 
(2.154) 
 
1.997 
(2.133) 
 
1.981 
(2.215) 
 
2.002 
(2.008) 
 
1.995 
(2.093) 
 
1.996 
(2.054) 
 
1.995 
(2.082) 
 
1.996 
(2.043) 
 
1.998 
(2.205) 
 
2.041 
(2.210) 
 
Notes: The bold numbers in parentheses refer to the retail segment. C denotes the constant term. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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In the wholesale segment, from the empirical results and the statistical tests 
(see subsequent section) it is obvious that negative coefficients are larger, in absolute 
value, than their positive counterparts for all the sample countries. This finding which 
is also evident in other empirical studies (Polemis, 2011; Grosso and Manera 2007; 
Contin et al. 2006) reflects the consumers’ perception of the actual effects of oil price 
variations on gasoline price changes at least in the short-run. This means that the 
effects of upstream price decreases are larger than those of price increases. Moreover, 
on average over the estimation period, spot prices of gasoline do not register a 
significant response to increases (or devaluations) in the euro dollar exchange rate. In 
other words, in the wholesale level, positive and negative changes of the exchange 
rate appear to be insignificant. This evidence suggests that refineries are generally 
reluctant to transfer to consumers those price increases or reductions originated from 
movements in exchange rates.  
The coefficients of the variables ECMPt-1 and ECMNt-1 indicate asymmetric 
adjustment speeds. In other words the positive and negative ECM coefficients are 
associated with adjustment to the long-run equilibrium level of price from above and 
from bellow. From the empirical results, we see that the positive coefficients are 
generally larger (in their absolute terms) than the negative ones for all the sample 
countries indicating a positive long-run asymmetry, which is not in alignment with the 
Wald test results (Table 6). However, the magnitude of the relevant error-correction 
terms varies significantly between the selected countries. In countries such as the UK, 
and Ireland, the negative error-correction term has estimated to slightly above unity, 
whereas appears to be significant smaller in the USA (-0.213) and Greece (-0.670). 
The same conclusion can be reached regarding the positive error-correction term. To 
sum up, the variation in the magnitude of the adjustment speeds primarily between the 
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USA and the European countries (e.g United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Austria) 
reveals important differences in the oil industry structure regarding the level of 
competition in the wholesale segment.   
Finally, the estimated autoregressive coefficients, which enter the model when 
the lag-length is equal to one (∆SPGt-1) are statistically significant and have the 
anticipated positive signs for the sample countries. The opposite holds when the lag 
length is set to two (∆SPGt-2).       
We now stress our attention into the examination of point estimates in the 
retail level specification. From the empirical results, we see that positive short-run 
spot price effect is larger than its negative counterpart in a number of countries 
(Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK and USA), while the reverse 
holds for the rest of the sample countries (Belgium, Greece, Netherlands and 
Portugal)12.  This means that retail gasoline prices seem to react more to price 
increases and to negative gaps to the equilibrium than to price decreases and positive 
disequilibrium. From the magnitude of the relevant estimates, we see that a 10% 
short-run increase in spot price of gasoline (wholesale price) will increase the net 
retail price of gasoline within the range from 1,57% (UK) to 5,05% (Germany) 
respectively. This outcome is intuitively valid, since crude oil, refining costs and 
profit account for roughly 30-40% of retail costs, while taxes (excise taxes and VAT) 
and wholesale margin account for another 70-60% on average.   
Regarding the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, we see that in 
most cases the positive coefficients are generally larger (in their absolute terms) than 
the negative ones thus indicating a positive long-run asymmetry in the retail segment 
for selected countries (Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and USA). 
                                                 
12
 In the case of Ireland the relevant magnitude comes with a negative sign and is not statistical 
significant.  
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However, in countries such as the UK, and Ireland, the negative error-correction term 
is larger than the positive one. Finally, the estimated autoregressive coefficient when 
the lag-length is equal to one (∆NRPt-1) is statistically significant with the anticipated 
positive sign for all the sample countries but for Ireland.  
If we try to compare the two-level analysis, some interesting remarks emerge. 
First, the magnitude of short-run coefficients is in the most sample countries larger in 
the wholesale than in the retail level. Second, the adjustment towards the equilibrium 
level is more gradual in the retail level revealing the structural differences between 
the wholesale and retail segment of the gasoline industry. Furthermore, the retailers 
tend to react more to price increases than price decreases compared to the 
wholesalers, indicating a different adjustment path to the long-run equilibrium level of 
price. Lastly, from the relevant magnitude of the price coefficients in the wholesale 
and the retail equations, we assume that retailers do not immediately transfer onto 
final prices (pump prices) all the adjustments in the wholesale prices. Instead changes 
time distributed.  
 
Testing for asymmetric responses  
The following table depicts the calculated Wald and F-statistics testing the 
asymmetry hypothesis in all of the two market segments. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis H0: λ+ = λ- implies asymmetric long-run adjustment, whereas short-run 
asymmetries (price and exchange rate) arise when at least one of the hypotheses H0: 
α
+
 = α
-
 or b+ = b-, is rejected.  
By using the relevant Wald tests, we see that the hypothesis of long-run 
symmetric adjustment speeds can not be rejected at the wholesale level for all the 
european countries except for the USA. We reach the same outcome when we test for 
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short-run asymmetries (price and exchange rate) since the null hypothesis (Ho: α+ = α- 
and Ho: b+ = b- respectively) cannot be rejected for all the sample countries (and the 
USA as well) suggesting the existence of symmetric adjustment speeds in the short-
run.  
 
Table 6: Computed Wald and F-tests of asymmetric responses  
Country   λ+ = λ- 
(Symmetric 
adjustment speeds) 
α+ = α- 
(price asymmetry) 
b+ = b- 
(exchange rate asymmetry) 
α+ = α- = β+ = β- = 0  
(short-run asymmetry) 
Wholesale segment: SPG = f(CR, EXR) 
Austria  -1,17 (0,24) -0,52 (0,60) -0,08 (0,93) 137,88* (0,00) 
Belgium  -1,17 (0,24) -0,55 (0,58) 0,11 (0,91) 141,07* (0,00) 
Finland  -1,16 (0,24) -0,52 (0,60) -0,23 (0,81) 137,04* (0,00) 
France  -1,17 (0,24) -0,53 (0,60) -0,13 (0,89) 138,46* (0,00) 
Germany  -1,20 (0,23) -0,52 (0,60) -0,23 (0,81) 142,87* (0,00) 
Greece  -1,29 (1,19) -0,32 (0,75) -0,08 (0,93) 167,37* (0,00) 
Ireland  -1,23 (0,22) -0,49 (0,63) 0,58 (0,56) 145,77* (0,00) 
Italy  -1,17 (0,24) -0,51 (0,61) -0,20 (0,84) 138,85* (0,00) 
Netherlands  -1,16 (0,25) -0,54 (0,59) -0,58 (0,56) 137,91* (0,00) 
Portugal  -1,18 (0,24) -0,53 (0,60) -0,23 (0,82) 139,57* (0,00) 
Spain  -1,17 (0,24) -0,51 (0,61) -0,24 (0,81) 137,08* (0,00) 
United Kingdom -1,22 (0,22) -0,52 (0,60) 0,28 (0,78) 154,55* (0,00) 
United States  -4,30*(0,00) -0,45 (0,65) - - 
Retail segment: NRPG = f(SPG) 
Austria  -1,95** (0,05) 2,14* (0,03) - - 
Belgium  2,58* (0,01) -0,30 (0,76) - - 
Finland  0,84** (0,40) 0,10 (0,92) - - 
France  3,05* (0,00) 5,52* (0,00) - - 
Germany  -0,56 (0,58) -1,29 (0,20) - - 
Greece  -0,55 (0,57) -1,29 (0,20) - - 
Ireland  1,70*** (0,09) -0,48 (0,63) - - 
Italy  0,24 (0,81) 0,30 (0,77) - - 
Netherlands  -3,70* (0,00) -0,41 (0,68) - - 
Portugal  0,27 (0,79) -0,61 (0,54) - - 
Spain  -1,96** (0,05) 2,76* (0,01) - - 
United Kingdom 0,14 (0,88) 1,78*** (0,06) - - 
United States  4,20* (0,00) 5,61* (0,00) - - 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
asymptotic P-values.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
 
When we simultaneously test the equality of all short-run parameters of the 
same lags in the wholesale level by using the F-statistic, the null hypothesis (equality 
hypothesis) is rejected for all the sample countries. However, we must be very 
skepticism when we perform the equality test, since there is a tendency to over-reject 
the null hypothesis of symmetry due to the low power of standard F statistics (Galeotti 
et al. 2003).  
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   From the combined results of the above-mentioned Wald-tests, we reach the 
conclusion that in European sample countries there is a symmetric response of the 
output prices of gasoline in the wholesale level both in the short and the long run 
respectively. This conclusion is in alignment with other empirical studies as well 
(Godby et al. 2000; Galeotti et al. 2003; Contin et al. 2006, Polemis, 2011) and runs 
contrary to the common perception regarding the price asymmetries that emerge in the 
gasoline market. Similar results can be found when testing for exchange rate 
asymmetry in the wholesale level. However, in the USA, the hypothesis of the 
symmetric adjustment speeds appears to be valid only in the short-run.    
When we investigate the issue of asymmetry in the retail segment of the gasoline 
industry, some important remarks emerge. Firstly, there is a wide variation in the 
existence of asymmetric price responses within the sample european countries. It is 
worth mentioning that in countries characterized by a high degree of competition such 
as Germany and the United Kingdom13, whose oil industry is consisted of vertically 
integrated companies and significant market players (hypermarkets, big groceries 
stores, etc) in the retail chain, the null hypothesis (symmetry) cannot be rejected in the 
long-run (P-value equals to 0,58 and 0,88 respectively). The absence of (long-run) 
asymmetry in the retail segment of the market is consisted with a previous study for 
the United Kingdom (OFT, 1998). On the other hand, the long-run symmetry 
hypothesis is rejected in a number of countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and the United States). From the short-run perspective, 
the existence of price asymmetry seems to hold only in Austria, France, Spain, UK 
and the USA14.   
                                                 
13
 In the United Kingdom, the supermarkets and the hypermarkets have grown continuously and 
significantly over the last years, whereas their volumes have grown at the expense of the traditional 
road site filling stations (OFT, 1998). 
14
 The results from the inclusion of the taxation are presented in the Appendix (see Table A3).  
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 IV.  Conclusions and policy implications  
 
The relevant empirical study uses an updated weekly dataset to carry out a 
thorough investigation of asymmetric gasoline price responses within the euro zone 
area (EZ-11), the UK and the USA. In the specific study, we used sophisticated 
econometric techniques (DOLS) in order to estimate asymmetric ECMs at each 
market segment (wholesale and retail segment). This technique allows us to 
distinguish between asymmetries arising from short-lived deviations in input prices 
and asymmetries concerning the speed at which the gasoline price reverts to its long-
run (equilibrium) level.  
The empirical results favor the common perception that wholesale and retail 
gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost increases and decreases. Except for the 
possible exercise of market power by the refineries operating in an oligopolistic way, 
asymmetries in the gasoline market are likely to be the outcome of other market 
parameters (i.e regulatory barriers, legal framework, etc).  
In order to eliminate price asymmetries in the euro area, government officials 
should pursue policies to enhance the level of competition in the relevant markets. 
One suitable policy to protect consumers from welfare loses concerns the 
implementation of regulatory and behavioural measures as well. To be more specific, 
the strengthening of the role of the wholesalers and the elimination of certain barriers 
to entry in the oil market could provide a suitable mechanism to enhance the level of 
petroleum imports in the euro area.  
Another suitable policy in order to prevent the market players from the 
imposition of exploitative practices (i.e price fixing, abuse of dominant position) that 
hinder the level of competition in all of the three market segments is linked with a 
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thorough investigation of mergers by the competition authorities. Mergers in the oil 
sector that increase market concentration without creating economies of scale or 
scope may lead to anticompetitive effects and increase the market power of the 
incumbents. In such cases where competition is hampered, the government should 
develop a closely monitoring of the market in order to prevent the marketers from 
concerted practices.  
In less deregulated countries (i.e Greece, Portugal, Spain), the government 
could enhance the level of competition by a further opening of the market to new 
entrants such as hypermarkets or big stores and by removing certain legal or technical 
barriers for the establishment of new filling stations. The industry structure in other 
European countries (United Kingdom, France and Germany) consisted of vertically 
integrated companies and significant market players (hypermarkets) in the retail chain 
of the industry could constitute a useful paradigm to the government officials and 
policy makers.   
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Table A1: Representation of the variables    
Variable Explanation Source Availability 
NRPG Net final gasoline (pump) 
price without taxes and 
charges  
European Oil Bulletin July 1996-August 2011 
(weekly basis) 
FPR Final gasoline (pump) 
price 
European Oil Bulletin July 1996-August 2011 
(weekly basis) 
FPRV Final gasoline (pump) 
price without VAT   
European Oil Bulletin July 1996-August 2011 
(weekly basis) 
FPREX Final gasoline (pump) 
price without excise tax  
European Oil Bulletin July 1996-August 2011 
(weekly basis) 
CR Crude oil price   USA Energy Information 
Administration 
July 1996-August 2011 
(weekly basis) 
SPG Gasoline spot price  USA Energy Information 
Administration 
July 1996-August 2011 
(weekly basis) 
EXR Exchange rate  European Central Bank 
and the Federal USA 
Bank 
July 1996-August 2011 
(daily basis) 
HCPI Harmonised consumer 
price index  
Eurostat  July 1996-August 2011 
(monthly basis) 
EXC Excise tax  European Oil Bulletin July 1996-August 2011 
 (weekly basis) 
VAT Value added tax  European Oil Bulletin July 1996-August 2011 
 (weekly basis) 
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Table A2: Alternative estimation results of the ECMs (Retail segment)   
Variables    Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK 
∆FPRVc,t = a0 +∑
=
p
i
ci FPRVb
1
i-t,
+∑
=
+ ∆
m
i
ri SPGPc
0
i-t,
+ ∑
=
− ∆
n
i
ri SPGNc
0
i-t,
+ 
+λ  ECMPt-1 + −λ  ECMNt-1 + εt 
c -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 -0.002** 
∆FPRVt-1 0.508* 0.429* -0.089*** 0.473* 0.295* 0.584* 0.031 0.540* 0.114* 0.527* 0.863* 0.200** 
ECMPt-1 -0.639* -0.603* -0.125*** -0.550* -0.606* -0.565* -0.125*** -0.494* -0.605* -0.260* -0.804* 0.147 
ECMNt-1 -0.639* -0.787* -0.136*** -0.362* -0.510* -0.557* 0.068 -0.424* -0.267* -0.149* -1.024* -0.245** 
∆SPGPt 0.186* 0.167* 0.178* 0.196* 0.204* 0.105* -0.021 0.126* 0.170* 0.010 0.065* 0.072** 
∆SPGNt 0.154* 0.151* 0.162* 0.127* 0.136* 0.162* 0.009 0.111* 0.175* 0.022** 0.135* 0.056*** 
Adjusted R2 0.452 [2.015] 0.252 [2.170] 0.216 [2.041] 0.598 [2.087] 0.326 [2.171] 0.433 [2.119] 0.598 [2.087] 0.462 [2.023] 0.477 [2.035] 0.229 [2.180] 0.330 [1.965] 0.072 [1.994] 
∆FPREXc,t = a0 +∑
=
p
i
ci FPREXb
1
i-t,
+∑
=
+ ∆
m
i
ri SPGPc
0
i-t,
+ ∑
=
−∆
n
i
ri SPGNc
0
i-t,
+ 
+λ  ECMPt-1 + −λ  ECMNt-1 + εt 
c -0.000 -0.003** -0.000 -0.001** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001 -0.005** 
∆FPREXt-1 0.524* 0.429* 0.003 0.520* 0.425* 0.564* 0.079 0.563* 0.107** 0.455* 0.676* 0.274* 
ECMPt-1 -0.729* -0.569* -0.156*** -0.702* -0.693* -0.527* -0.164** -0.478* -0.581* -0.282* -0.548* 0.081 
ECMNt-1 -0.590* -0.842* -0.222** -0.314* -0.699* -0.878* 0.059 -0.531* -0.257* -0.294* -0.688* -0.281* 
∆SPGPt 0.390* 0.386* 0.407* 0.451* 0.429* 0.312* -0.031 0.241* 0.396* 0.065*** 0.090* 0.128** 
∆SPGNt 0.303* 0.406* -0.083 0.251* 0.279* 0.465* 0.033 0.207* 0.408* 0.102* 0.191* 0.072*** 
Adjusted R2 0.445 [2.018] 0.269 [2.177] 0.221 [2.053] 0.650 [2.004] 0.366 [2.126] 0.391 [2.080] 0.005 [2.012] 0.500 [2.039] 0.509 [2.042] 0.129 [2.117] 0.354 [2.108] 0.091 [2.004] 
∆FPRc,t = a0 +∑
=
p
i
ci FPRb
1
i-t,
+∑
=
+ ∆
m
i
ri SPGPc
0
i-t,
+ ∑
=
− ∆
n
i
ri SPGNc
0
i-t,
+ 
+λ ECMPt-1 + −λ  ECMNt-1 + εt 
∆FPRt-1 0.511* 0.429* -0.086 0.485* 0.316* 0.597* 0.039 0.548* 0.117* 0.490* 0.840* 0.180** 
∆FPRt-2 - - -0.073** - - - - - - - - - 
∆SPGPt 0.208* 0.190* 0.200* 0.221* 0.223* 0.157* -0.022 0.139* 0.191* 0.014 0.077* 0.071** 
∆SPGNt 0.169* 0.177* 0.188* 0.138* 0.149* 0.215* 0.012 0.120* 0.195* 0.027** 0.136* 0.058** 
∆SPGNt-1 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.068* 
ECMPt-1 -0.648* -0.594* -0.140*** -0.598* -0.629* -0.587* -0.126*** -0.504* -0.619* -0.260* -0.741* 0.181** 
ECMNt-1 -0.630* -0.805* -0.152** -0.353* -0.536* -0.733* 0.060 -0.435* -0.276* -0.028 -0.924* -0.233* 
c -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.001 
Adjusted R2 0.459 [2.018] 0.258 [2.176] 0.220 [2.014] 0.614 [2.071] 0.332 [2.164] 0.421 [2.073] 0.001 [2.005] 0.480 [2.015] 0.487 [2.038] 0.204 [2.128] 0.387 [1.975] 0.102 [1.977] 
Notes: The numbers in square brackets refer to the Durbin Watson statistic. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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Table A3: Computed Wald tests of asymmetric responses final price (retail segment)  
Country   λ+ = λ-  
(Symmetric adjustment speeds) 
α+ = α- 
(price asymmetry) 
 FPR = f(SPG)  
Austria  -0,16 (0,87) 7,87** (0,00) 
Belgium  2,34** (0,02) 0,40 (0,69) 
Finland  0,13 (0,90) 0,28 (0,78) 
France  -2,47* (0,01) 5,01** (0,00) 
Germany  -1,00 (0,32) 2,61** (0,01) 
Greece  1,22** (0,22) -1,68*** (0,09) 
Ireland  -1,98** (0,05) -0,79 (0,43) 
Italy  -0,65 (0,52) 1,05 (0,30) 
Netherlands  -3,50* (0,00) -0,19 (0,85) 
Portugal  -2,47* (0,01) -0,59 (0,55) 
Spain  1,58 (0,11) -2,60* (0,01) 
United Kingdom 4,94* (0,00) 0,31 (0,76) 
United States  - - 
FPRV = f(SPG) 
Austria  0,00 (0,99) 1,54 (0,12) 
Belgium  2,01** (0,05) 0,55 (0,58) 
Finland  0,12 (0,90) 0,48 (0,63) 
France  -1,92** (0,05) 4,58* (0,00) 
Germany  -1,05 (0,29) 2,60 * (0,01) 
Greece  -0,08 (0,93) -1,76 (0,08) 
Ireland  -2,08** (0,04) -0,77 (0,44) 
Italy  -0,66 (0,51) 0,90 (0,37) 
Netherlands  -3,43* (0,00) -0,23 (0,82) 
Portugal  -1,58 (0,12) -0,63 (0,53) 
Spain  -1,94** (0,05) -2,99* (0,00) 
United Kingdom 4,55* (0,00) 0,35 (0,73) 
United States  - - 
FPREX = f(SPG) 
Austria  -1,34 (0,18) 3,13* (0,00) 
Belgium  3,15* (0,00) -0,32 (0,75) 
Finland  0,75 (0,46) 0,55 (0,58) 
France  -3,53* (0,00) 5,80* (0,00) 
Germany  0,07 (0,97) 2,44* (0,01) 
Greece  3,36* (0,00) -2,34** (0,02) 
Ireland  -2,32** (0,02) -0,84 (0,40) 
Italy  0,50 (0,62) 1,10 (0,27) 
Netherlands  -3,26* (0,00) -0,28 (0,78) 
Portugal  0,12 (0,90) -0,66 (0,51) 
Spain  1,22 (0,22) -2,69* (0,01) 
United Kingdom 4,58* (0,00) 0,68 (0,50) 
United States  - - 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. The numbers in parenthesis are the 
asymptotic P- values.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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